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United States v. McOmber, A Brief Critique
By: Captain Fred Lederer, JAGC, Instructor,
Criminal Law Division, T JAGSA

The facts of United States v. McOmber 1 are
simple. Airman McOmber was implicated in the

theft of a tape deck and given his Article
3l(b)-Miranda warnings by an Agent C.
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McOmber requested counsel and was referred to
the area defense counsel. Two months later (and
after McOmber's defense counsel had discussed
the case with the agent) the same agent interviewed McOmber about the tape deck theft and
other thefts. Completely warned, McOmber
made an incriminating written statement. The
agent did not give notice to McOmber's attorney. The Court of Military Appeals, per Chief
Judge Fletcher, held "that once an investigator
is on notice that an attorney has undertaken to
represent an individual in a military criminal investigation, further questioning of the accused
without affording counsel reasonable opportunity to be present renders any statement obtained involuntary under Article 31(d) of the
Uniform Code." 2 It should be noted that the
Government had conceded that the defense
counsel should have been notified but had argued that the failure to do so was not prejudicial.

Chief Judge Fletcher desired to avoid the
sixth amendment constitutional issue-a desire
particularly appropriate in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Middendorf v.
Henry. 10 Accordingly he based his holding that
notification was required on Article 27 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.
§ 827 (1970). The primary difficulty is that Article 27 deals with assignment of counsel for special and general courts-martial-or in short for
purposes of trial. The Court of Military Appeals
expressly held in United States v. Clark 11 that
there is no right to counsel at interrogations
other than the right specified in Miranda.
Where then does this notification provision
come from? It is well and good to find that, once
counsel is assigned, effective assistance of counsel requires notification of interrogations. However, is that required when counsel are assigned
despite Article 27 rather than because of Article
27?

At its best, McOmber is a long delayed decision limiting the possibility of police circumvention of the rights to counsel given by Miranda v.
Arizona 3 and Massiah v. United States. 4 At its
worst, the opinion appears analytically unsound
and may suggest unnecessarily a major change
in military criminal law. The dilemma is caused
by Judge Fletcher's attempt to avoid coming to
grips with the constitutional issue, relying instead "on statutory grounds," 5 grounds which I
suggest are questionable at best.

The Court of Military Appeals held in 1973 in
United States v. Clark 11 that United States v.
Ternpia 12 had incorporated into military law
only the minimum requirements of Miranda and
that paragraph 140(a) (2) of the MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, despite its apparent clear
meaning, could not be interpreted to give any
greater rights. The only reference of note to
rights to counsel at interrogations in the Manual
is paragraph 140(a) (2), and Judge Darden's
opinion presents the strong inference that no
statutory right to counsel at interrogations
exist-such a right coming only from Miranda.
How can Article 27 affect the issue? The Court
seems to be saying that effective assistance of
counsel at trial requires effective assistance of
counsel at an interrogation. This is surely
reasonable but can this be said when there is ordinarily no general statutory right to counsel at
interrogations? The reader of M cOrnber would
be tempted to conclude that the source of the
new notification provision is either based in
paragraph 140(a) (2) or in the constitutional
provisions giving rise to Miranda or Massiah.
Yet, the opinion denies these possibilities.

Courts across the United States have failed to
definitively decide the issue that faced the
Court of Military Appeals. 6 The positions have
ranged from that taken by past military decisions, allowing questioning with full warnings
and waiver but without notification to counsel, 7
to the New York rule that prevents waiver
without the physical presence of the attorney
whose presence is to be waived. 8 Notification to
counsel has been defended as necessary to ensure full compliance with the Supreme Court's
decisions in Miranda and Massiah and to prevent subtle coercion to waive counsel rights.
The problem with McOmber is not in its ultimate
holding but in its rationale. Indeed the members
of the Court have indicated unhappiness with
the prior notification rule for some years. 9

McOmber leaves the reader in mystery. Chief
Judge Fletcher states that a statement obtained
in violation of the new notification provision will
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result in the statement obtained being excluded
pursuant to Article 31 (d) which includes statements obtained in violation of Article 31 (which
fails to mention counsel at all) "or through the
use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful
inducement." 13 Does failure to notify constitute
coercion or unlawful influence? Such a conclusion seems difficult to draw although exclusion
could easily be dictated by Miranda or Massiah.
Because of the unusual phrasing of the
McOmber opinion-an opinion that certainly
appears correct in terms of result-more legal
questions may have been created than have
been resolved. As it is difficult to find the source
of the statutory right that Chief Judge Fletcher
makes use of, it may be that the Court has now
found a new right to counsel at interrogations. If ·
so, this new right may be grounded in Article
27, or, unlikely as it seems, 14 in Article 31, or in
the court's supervisory power over military
justice-exercised perhaps to make Articles 27
and 31 truly meaningful. In view of this lack of
clarity we can only hope for later cases to resolve this perplexing question.

2. ld. at 6.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) hereinafter cited as Miranda.
4. 377 U.S. 201 (1963) hereinafter cited as Massiah.
5. McOmbet· at 4-5.

6. See e.g., United States v. Zamora, 460 F.2d 1272 (9th
Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 881 (1972) and United States v.
Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.) cet·t. denied, 409 U.S.
873 (1972).
7. See e.g., United States v. Flack, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 201,43
C.M.R. 41 (1970); United States v. Robinson, 49 C.M.R.
183 (ACMR 1974).
8. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y. 2d 325, 292 N. Y.S. 2d 663, 239
N.E. 2d 537 (1968).
9. See e.g., Judge Ferguson's opinion in United States v.
Johnson, 20 U.S. C. M.A. 320, 43 C.M.R. 160, 164-65 (1971)
[opinion relying upon MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1969
(Rev. ed.), para. 44h]; United States v. Estep, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 201, 41 C.M.R. 201 (1970).
10. 47 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1976). This case was published in full
at 74-6 JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERVICE 19 (DA Pam
27-76-4, 1976).
11. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 570, 48 C.M.R. 77 (1973).
12. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
13. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 31(d), 10 U.S.C.
§ 83l(d) (1970).

Notes
1. No. 30, 817 (U.S.C.M.A. 2 April1976) hereinafter cited
as McOmber.

14. See generally, Lederer, Rights Wanzings in the MilitanJ, 72 MIL. L. REV. 1 (176).

